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The persistence of traditional monarchies in modern societies, which are otherwise char-
acterized by democratic and egalitarian values, remains a paradox in the social sciences.
In part this is attributable to the lack of psychological investigation into the relationship
between subject and sovereign, and in particular the ways in which the political and social
values of the citizenry shape understandings of a hereditary monarch’s right to represent a
national community. Adopting the qualitative analysis methods of discursive psychology
and grounded theory, the current study examines vernacular accounts of nationhood and
monarchy in England in both formalized conversational interviews (n = 60) and impromptu
street interviews (n = 56). Focusing on accounts of Prince Charles’s recent proposal to
change the role of the monarch, from “Defender of the (Christian) Faith” to “Defender of
Faiths,” those in favor treated it as a positive step towards reflecting a diverse (religious)
community, bringing the monarchy into line with current concerns of pluralism and uphold-
ing values of personal choice and individual rights. Participants who rejected the proposed
change in title construed it as antithetical to these values in terms of reflecting personal
stake and interest, an abuse of power, or an imposition on other faiths. In all accounts, the
prime concern was in safeguarding the political and social values of the citizenry. In
conclusion it is argued that the study of subjects’ relationship to the monarch, its function
and legitimacy, can provide an opportunity to examine how values can characterize a
national community and facilitate national diversity.
KEY WORDS: Monarchy, nationhood, England, democracy, hereditary
In his study of ordinary British subjects’ vernacular accounts of the monarchy,
Billig (1992) makes the point that social psychology has offered little work on the
relationship between monarch and subjects. Almost 20 years later this remains the
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case. Given social and political psychology’s interest in nationhood, the scarcity of
research on how subjects understand this role of symbolic leader of a nation is
notable. We argue that this is attributable to three main lacunae in the literature: the
neglect of traditional forms of leadership; the lack of focus on the constitutional
context of national identity; and the neglect of the values particular to specific
national identities.
The Monarch as Leader
Social psychological work on leadership has developed from a focus on the
behavior of leaders and situational demands on leadership style (Lippitt &
White, 1943; Fiedler, 1965) to the interactions between leader and follower, as
identified in transactional and transformational leadership (e.g., House &
Shamir, 1993; Kark, Shamir, & Chen, 2003), sometimes taking into account
physiological traits of leaders (e.g., Sosik, Avolio, & Dong, 2002). If we turn to
the recent resurgence of work on leadership in social psychology we find that
there remains an absence of work that examines symbolic rather than transfor-
mational leadership. Social Identity and Self-Categorization theoretical perspec-
tives have predominantly focused on how leaders emerge as prototypical
members of a group, forging a common ingroup identity and appearing socially
attractive to their followers (Fielding & Hogg, 1997; Hogg, 2001; Hogg et al.,
2006; Hogg et al., 2005).
Some observations have been made about this body of research. Platow et al.
(2006) note how leadership work is often leader-centric, focusing on qualities the
leader is assumed to have. They suggest that attention needs to be paid to how
followers attribute leadership qualities, such as charisma, to leaders. Moreover,
Haslam and Reicher (2007) argue that SIT and SCT approaches to leadership tend
to undertheorize the active common construction of common ingroup identity
which followers and leaders are assumed to share. They note that social identities
are demonstrably context-dependent and constructed in the perceived reality of
the situation. Perhaps more pertinently, current approaches to leadership tend to
assume horizontal communities, such that group members are interchangeable and
hence anyone can potentially lead a group. However communities may also be
vertical, where leadership roles are not a consequence of perceived ingroup pro-
totypicality, but are based on custom and convention (Meindl, 1995). These
leaders may not be transformative, but fulfill a symbolic leadership role with the
purpose of perpetuating group norms and structures. Such societal roles have long
been described in the sociological literature as “traditional” (Hobsbawm, 1983;
Shils, 2006; Weber, 1958) and as more characteristic of long-established, hierar-
chical, static social organisations. In this sense, psychological approaches have
tended to neglect established forms of leadership that rely upon convention and
tradition. More specifically, despite a handful of research concerning individual
members of the royal family, most notably the life and death of Princess Diana
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(e.g., Abell & Stokoe, 1999, 2001; Abell, Stokoe, & Billig, 2000; Macmillan &
Edwards, 1999), the relationship between monarchy and the ordinary folk it seeks
to represent remains underinvestigated.
This is even more of a surprising absence if we consider the importance of
the monarchy within the United Kingdom. Constitutionally the monarch (Queen
Elizabeth II) is the Head of State and head of the Church of England. Within
England the reigning sovereign also has the title and role of Defender of the
(Christian) Faith. In the absence of a formal written constitution the monarch’s
royal prerogative powers are upheld in custom, practice, and convention rather
than legally. These include the right to take the country into war, to make peace, to
appoint the Prime Minister, to summon and dissolve Parliament; “In law, Parlia-
ment is the creature of the monarch” (Harvey, 2004, p. 39). Whilst the current
monarch chooses not to exercise her royal political powers, there is nothing to state
that a future one couldn’t.
This has become highlighted as the heir to the throne, Prince Charles, is often
accused of making his political views on a range of matters, from EU policies to
architecture, known and as such has been accused of threatening a “constitutional
crisis.” For example, in 2002 he declared that when he comes to the throne, in
England he shall be the Defender of Faiths rather than Defender of the Faith. This
not only caused a media outcry but also brought into focus the tensions that exist
between Crown, State, religion and democratic values in the United Kingdom, and
specifically in England.
Constitutional Considerations
Constitutionally the United Kingdom experienced the most significant change
in over 300 years with the devolution of government power as Assemblies were
granted to Northern Ireland and Wales, and a Parliament to Scotland. Outwith
psychology, political, historical, and media commentators and scholars have been
quick to point out the increasingly tricky position the British monarchy finds itself
in as a consequence of constitutional change. Harvey (2004) notes that as the
hereditary right of peers to sit in the House of Lords was ended after 700 years by
the then Prime Minister Tony Blair, and as a result of the devolution of government
power, the United Kingdom leaves a glaringly obvious anomaly at its helm: a
hereditary monarch. The principle of hereditary right is incompatible with that of
democracy (see also Cannadine, 2004). Harvey remarks that hereditary rights
continue to uphold discriminatory practices of religious and sexist bias that would
in other forms of social life be unacceptable in a democratic society.
Nairn (1988) observes that the monarchy is a crucial component in a world of
nation-states in its representation of a national people. This is apparent in Britain
where the monarchy remains a popular symbolic cornerstone of the nation. Ref-
erences to “Britain” in everyday talk of British nationals often concern the mon-
archy rather than the government, territory, or the people (Condor, 1997; Condor
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& Abell, 2006b). This is further evidenced in the British Social Attitudes survey,
which contains a question asking how important the continuation of the monarchy
is in Britain. Consistently, results show that over 70% of people surveyed indicate
that it is “quite” or “very” important. Greyser, Balmer, and Urde (2006) argue that
one explanation for this popularity is the perceived function of a monarch to create
unity in diversity. The royal family can act as a form of social glue in holding
together an otherwise diverse population.
Clearly then, one of the most important challenges for existing European
monarchies in the modern democratic world is to reinvent themselves in terms of
new roles, functions, and rationales for their continued existence in a democratic
society. Monarchies succeed or fail on the basis of how credible and convincing
they are over those whom they reign (Cannadine, 2004). As research has observed,
their attendance at football matches, pop concerts, and the media’s role in broad-
casting royal events to mass audiences has occurred at a time when the nation
increases its democratic policies (Cannadine, 1983, 2004; Cardiff & Scannell,
1987; Dayan & Katz, 1992).
In Billig’s Talking of the Royal Family (1992) he observes the tension
between democracy and hereditary monarchy in Britain, declaring: “In a country
supposedly imbued with the values of democracy—indeed in the country which
proclaims itself to be the home of democracy—this ancient institution of inherited
status still persists” (p. 1). As such, he identifies irreverent, often disrespectful and
egalitarian discourses such as “they’re doing a job,” as ways of managing ideo-
logical dilemmas, as participants grapple with the common-sense principles of
democracy and hereditary rule. Billig proposes that lurking beneath such discourse
is an implicit understanding that “we” are their employers, noting: “It’s as if the
ordinary subject occupies the superior position, and royalty awaits the jury’s
decision. Symbols of inequity are being reversed” (1992, p. 14). Similarly, in her
mass media study of the Danish Royal Family, Phillips (1999) draws comparisons
with Billig’s work and examines how a largely supportive media reconciles
democracy with hereditary rule through the presentation of the monarchy using
egalitarian discourse. Phillips suggests: “The effect may be to reinforce the
national self-image of Denmark as an egalitarian democracy in which people are
not servile royal subjects but citizens who choose to support the monarchy as
symbols of the nation” (p. 233). By means of the media, Phillips argues that
support for the monarchy is discursively won.
The Specific Context of Englishness
So far this work has illustrated how political values of democracy have
implications for how ordinary people understand their relationship to the mon-
archy and how it is presented to subjects. But these values also have implica-
tions for how we understand and legitimize the role of the monarchy in
representing the national population as a whole. This is especially pertinent in
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England where a growing body of political and social psychological work has
considered vernacular understandings of nationhood and national identity.
Condor’s thesis that people in England resist categorizations of a homogenous
national identity due to its associations with racial exclusion and xenophobia has
highlighted the problematic tendency in social psychology to conflate national
group citizenship with feelings of shared national identity (Condor, 2000, 2006).
This has provoked an array of research studies illustrating the point, including the
disparity between support for the England football team and claims of common
national identity and pride (Abell, Condor, Lowe, Gibson, & Stevenson, 2007),
explaining away service in the British armed forces as a matter of social networks
and skill acquisition rather than collective national pride (Gibson & Abell, 2004;
Gibson & Condor, 2009), and the examination of repertoires of national geography
to manage matters of national and political community (Abell, Condor, & Steven-
son, 2006). Running though all these studies are the values of personal liberty,
accommodation, and cultural pluralism that exist within England and the impli-
cations these have for social and political life. Specifically, Condor and Gibson
(2007) have considered the implications these ideological values in England have
for political behavior in young people. Drawing on types of citizenship as identi-
fied by Oldfield (1990), they examine how young people grapple with an ideo-
logical tension between liberal individualism (passive citizenship) and
communitarianism (active citizenship), in explaining political participation and
disengagement. Contrary to explanations that explain political inactivity as a
consequence of apathy, ignorance about political matters, and no sense of com-
munity (cf. the Crick Report; Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998), they
note how ideological dilemmas surrounding liberal democracy function in
legitimizing political (dis) engagement.
Political disengagement has also been evidenced in English responses to
constitutional change within the United Kingdom. What dominated political
and a media debate prior to devolution was the anticipated English backlash.
Moral panics declared that the English would be concerned with the fragmen-
tation of a British identity, resist devolution, and even worse, assert their col-
lective English national identity and demand their own political voice. However,
subsequent research and attitude surveys have revealed these fears to be
unfounded (e.g., Curtice, 2003; Curtice & Heath, 2000; Curtice & Sandford,
2004). Contrary to popular explanations of English apathy, which include arro-
gance and a lack of national identity (cf. Aughey, 2007), theorists have argued
that political disengagement can be better understood as a rational response
(Condor, 2006, 2008a, 2008b; Condor & Abell, 2006a, 2006b). Whilst national
identity might be considered to be a reasonable ground for political action for
Scotland, this was certainly not regarded to be the case in England. Adopting
values of pluralism and liberal democracy, people in England considered the
mobilization of English national identity for political gain as a regressive step
and illegitimate.
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The aims of this present study are therefore to examine how ordinary people in
England understand the role of a symbolic leader, a hereditary monarch, in repre-
senting its people. More specifically, in England where political and social values of
democracy, pluralism, and civil liberty permeate understandings of nationhood, we
seek to examine how subjects negotiate the legitimacy of a hereditary monarch in
representing a national people. It takes as its focus participants’ concerns regarding
Prince Charles’s 2002 declaration to become Defender of Faiths rather than the
current Defender of the (Christian) Faith. As such, it draws on matters pertaining to
democracy, the legitimacy of hereditary rule, and who “we” are that are represented.
Method
The data were taken from two sources. The first was a five-year panel study
(2000–2005) involving qualitative interviews monitoring reactions to devolution
in England to U.K. constitutional change.1 In accordance with standard recom-
mendations for qualitative research, respondents were recruited with a view to
ensuring sample diversity. Two key sites in England were selected on the basis of
their contrasting character: Greater Manchester and rural East Sussex. Within each
site, panel members were recruited through a combination of open and theoretical
sampling to ensure heterogeneity in terms of age (range 16–89), gender, political
affiliation, and socioeconomic status. For the present purposes only interviews
with white respondents in England (N = 60) were examined.
Respondents were interviewed individually or together with a friend or partner.
Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 4 hours, with a mean of approximately 90
minutes. The research was introduced simply as a study of “people’s attitudes to
where they live” in the context of “recent political changes.” Matters of the
monarchy were mostly raised in response to direct questions about the Queen’s
Golden Jubilee celebrations (June 2002) and Prince Charles’s declaration to
become Defender of the Faiths when he comes to the throne. However, some
instances of monarchy talk were spontaneously raised when discussing issues
related to Europe and the United States.
The second source of data came from 56 informal interviews conducted with
individuals, couples, groups of friends, and family groups approached informally
on the streets and in public parks during the time of the Queen’s Golden Jubilee
celebrations (4–7 June 2002). In these interviews people were asked about their
activities over the Jubilee weekend as well as their thoughts and opinions on the
monarchy generally. This provided an interview context in which issues of mon-
archy, rather than political change and national identity, are the focus of conver-
sation, hence allowing the examination of talk around monarchy under a different
set of interactional concerns.
1
“Migrants and Nationals,” funded by the Leverhulme Trust Constitutional Change and Identity
programme (Grant number: 35113) conducted jointly with David McCrone, Frank Bechofer, and
Richard Kiely, Edinburgh University.
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Analytical Procedure
Interviews were audio recorded, transcribed for content and basic features
noted using a simplified form of Jefferson (2004) transcription conventions.2 All
transcripts were thoroughly anonymized prior to analysis.
All stretches of talk that included reference to the monarchy and/or royal
family were indexed and extracted for further analysis using Atlas t,3 a software
package for the management of textual material. Analysis began with the identi-
fication of rhetorical commonplaces (Billig, 1987) or interpretative repertoires
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987) used by respondents in accounts of the monarchy
and/or royal family. Inductive techniques based on Grounded Theory (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967) using constant comparison and deviant case analysis were used to
identify the conditions under which a type of response occurred and to map out
variability across the data set. Discursive psychology was applied to the data to
examine how accounts are rhetorically organized in producing responses in favor
of, or opposed to, the proposed constitutional change (Edwards & Potter, 1992;
Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996). Rhetorically interesting features such as the con-
struction of matters of stake and interest were analyzed for their function in these
accounts.
Analysis
The analysis first considers those respondents who proposed that the proposed
constitutional change in the role of the monarch would be a positive move. For
some respondents the Defender of Faiths role was a progressive step forward in
representing the value of individual liberty:
Extract 1: “He should defend people’s right to have their own personal faith”
1 I One thing that’s come up recently was Prince Charles’s notion of if he were to
2 become king being defender of faiths. What do you think of that?
3 Colin Well as a pagan I don’t worry at all, I have no faith so it doesn’t worry me at all. I
4 think as a concept I think it’s very good because personally I would support
5 disestablishment of the church, I don’t think the state has any business whatsoever
6 in being involved in any religion at all. I suppose being a pagan, agnostic, I would be
7 saying that. But I think (.) no (.) I rather resent the fact that the state has a preferred
8 religion. I think the state should be completely secular. I don’t agree with Mr Blair’s
9 faith schools, I think they’re, I think it’s another case of muddle-bosh thinking. I
10 don’t even agree with Catholic schools I’m afraid or C of E schools. I think all schools
11 should be secular. Teach religion by all means teach it. But I think it’s a matter of
12 personal and family choice. If parents want to bring their children up in a particular
13 faith that’s entirely their business, to be left to them. And their child, in their turn,
2 This included information concerning timing of pauses (measured in seconds and indicated in
brackets) and points of emphasis.
3 Atlas Version 4.2 London: Scolari. Sage Publications Software, 2000.
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14 when they are grown up can decide for themselves which faiths they choose. I
15 think that’s my own belief because it is such a personal decision that the state
16 should not be involved in any one faith. And in that sense I suppose I would support
17 it so far that he should defend people’s right to have their own personal faith. As
18 long as that faith of course does not then mean the destruction of the people who
19 are not of their faith
Recurrent across our data set, participants presented their views as those of
someone who had no religion and no personal stake in the Defender of the
Faiths issue. Colin begins his account pointing to his pagan status, his lack of
religion, and therefore his absence of investment in the issue (“so it doesn’t
worry me at all,” line 1). However, his argument that the state should be dis-
established from religion is treated as coming from an interested party, and he
confesses his stake in the issue (“I would be saying that,” lines 6–7). However,
the “But” (line 7) signals his view as not being just based on his paganism but
on broader concerns. These include favoritism (“a preferred religion,” lines 7–8),
and “muddle-bosh thinking” (line 9) that have led to faith schools. Unsure of the
interviewer’s own views or religion, Colin offers mitigation for his comments
(“I’m afraid,” line 10) and presents a personal opinion (“I think,” “my own
belief,” lines 14–15) rather than seeking to speak for anyone else. That religion
should be a “choice” rather than imposed by state or education is emphasized in
the remainder of this extract. Whilst children are not presented as having cat-
egory entitlements to make their own decision, for adults, their children’s and
their own religion is “entirely their business, to be left to them” (line 13).
Support for Prince Charles’s declaration to become Defender of Faiths is con-
ditional on it being a defense for choice, individual rights, religious pluralism,
and freedom for all.
The Defender of Faiths role could also be supported on the basis that it
represented a diverse population:
Extract 2: “He is king of everybody here”
1 I I remember hearing that Prince Charles well, he was saying that well, if he was ever
2 going to become king, he’d er (.) he said he’d want to be defender of all faiths. Do
3 you think that’s—
4 Wen Well, he’s head of the Church of England, how can he?
5 Bob Ah, but you can also argue that as head of the Church of England that was set up to
6 worship Henry VIII, how can he be defender of the faith anyway? That was set up
7 because he didn’t want people worshipping God. Ha, ha! He said, look, what is this
8 God you’re worshipping? I’m your king. You should be worshipping me. Set up the
9 Church of England and that’s where it all stemmed from, so (1) but I don’t see it as
10 being a problem because there are that many faiths over here now. And if he were
11 going to be the king of England then he is king of everybody here. And you’ve got
12 Muslims and so on. Buddhists and everybody, so he has to be. Like anybody pays
13 any attention to him anyway!
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Wendy points to a constitutional fact that prevents Charles from taking on this
role (line 4). However, invoking the historical figure of Henry VIII, the legiti-
macy of the existing constitution is undermined by her husband Bob who points
to the self-interested motivation on which it is based. He uses active voicing
(Wooffitt, 1992) to display Henry VIII’s vanity in forming the constitution (“I’m
your king. You should be worshipping me,” line 8). Having produced the stake
that drove the current relationship between religion and state, he offers his own
position as one that is consistent with increasing diversity that has occurred
within the country (“there are that many faiths over here now,” line 10). The
three-part list of religions residing in the country includes a generalized list
completer “everybody” (Jefferson, 1990) to argue that the role of the monarch is
to represent such diversity. This bears some resemblance to Greyser, Balmer and
Urde’s (2006) observation that people support the role of the monarch to the
extent that it offers unity in diversity. However, Bob ends his account noting the
insignificance and the powerlessness of Prince Charles (“Like anybody pays any
attention to him anyway,” lines 12–13). As Billig (1992) noted in his own study,
people support the monarchy to the extent that it is seen as purely symbolic,
powerless, and doesn’t interrupt everyday life.
That the role of the monarch is to represent diversity could also be represented
as consistent with changes in wider society:
Extract 3: “Part of the national curriculum”
1 I I remember over the past few years Prince Charles declared that he was going to
2 become defender of faiths in general rather than the faith.
3 Zoe Oh that’s right, yes. And the Queen she visited a mosque recently didn’t she?
4 I That’s right, yes
5 Zoe And there was quite a lot about it, that she hadn’t done that before. And it’s quite,
6 as a school they make a lot of effort to um, you know, to bring in all the faiths. My
7 little boy is 7 and they have religious education and it’s covered all the faiths you
8 know so he will come back and tell me a little bit about all of them which was
9 certainly not the case when I was at school. I should imagine that’s part of the
10 national curriculum actually rather than being specific to Manchester, that is one of
11 the core subjects.
In response to the interviewer’s comment on Prince Charles’s declared change of
role, Zoe offers a concrete example of the increasing religious inclusiveness of the
royal family, noting the Queen’s visit to a mosque. The recency of this is observed
as is the implicit notion that the royal family are playing catch-up with the rest of
society in becoming more inclusive. This implicit criticism is further warranted in
Zoe’s account of her son’s education in “all the faiths,” which is now part of the
“national curriculum” (line 10), and “one of the core subjects” (line 11). The
narrative sequencing of these events is rhetorically interesting as the Queen’s
recent visit to a Mosque is followed by a description of the “lot of effort” (line 6)
displayed by the school in being inclusive. Implicitly there is an accusation that the
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royal family has previously been out of step, and possibly not doing enough to
engage with a fundamental national concern for religious diversity.
To not be inclusive was equated with intolerance, narrow-mindedness and
naivety:
Extract 4: “You have got to be open-minded”
1 I I suppose one other thing was Prince Charles was a couple of years ago I think, that
2 if he was going to become king he’d be defender of all faiths as opposed to just
3 Church of England
4 Russ See, I love that.
5 I Yeah?
6 Russ Yeah. My mother wouldn’t agree at all. Now my mother, politics and religion,
7 you’re going to hurt me with these things [laughing]. I’ve got strong opinions on
8 these because I’ve had a Christian upbringing. I lived with my grandmother and my
9 sister, my mother, and my father they are all Christian . . . basically, yeah I would argue
10 with my mother about, she’ll frown at Buddhism or whatever because I very nearly
11 did a course which spent 2 weeks and you could do it for free in a Buddhist
12 monastery. If I told my mother she’d be so upset because I had not, I had to put a
13 line in that I never set out to hurt her religion you know, so she frowned upon it and
14 I’d say “Mum, come on that’s not fair because you think about the majority of
15 people who frown upon Christianity and just think about one person follows one
16 person you have got to be open-minded” and she said “yes but there is only one God”
17 and blah, blah, blah. We do it nearly every day at the moment. Last night again she
18 was giving me a bible passage. She’s a wonderful woman, a wonderful lady but
19 what I hate, for me it’s like a naivety that you won’t accept these other ones, so for
20 Prince Charles to say that is wonderful I think (.) Brilliant.
Russ’s positive emotional evaluation of Charles’s change of role is warranted on
his characterization of religious bias, depicted through a personal account of his
mum’s Christianity. Signalling the start of a story (“Now my mother,” line 6), Russ
warrants his own attitudes on matters pertaining to religion (“strong opinions”),
upon his marginal nonreligious position in an otherwise Christian family. More
specifically, his mother’s intolerance of other religions is presented in contrast
to Russ’s tolerance, and her beliefs are offered as nonnegotiable and inhibiting.
They have practical implications preventing Russ from getting on in life in terms
of embarking on a course, and also emotional ones requiring him to justify his
choices as not being intentionally anti-Christian. Reporting his conversation with
his mother, Russ makes the accusation that her views are contradictory and not
“open-minded” (line 16). Her response is represented in a brief bottom-line argu-
ment (“There is only one God,” line 16) and glossed as not worth engaging with
(“blah, blah, blah,” line 17). The dogmatism of religion is further represented in the
daily arguments between Russ and his mum and her quotation of bible passages.
As such, those who are religious are presented as narrow-minded and intolerant.
Interestingly his mum’s religious views are not treated as damaging to her char-
acter. His mum is “a wonderful woman, a wonderful lady” (line 18). Her naivety
494 Abell and Stevenson
and intolerant views are attributed to religion. In conclusion the change in role for
Prince Charles is appraised as “wonderful” and “brilliant” (line 20), as it repre-
sents a counter to the intolerance of religious bias.
As well as causing intolerance and narrow-mindedness, the role of religion
in conflict could also be invoked in offering support for Charles’s Defender of
Faiths role:
Extract 5: “Problems have been caused by religion”
1 I What do you think of Prince Charles saying that if he became King he’d like to be
2 defender of faiths as opposed to the faith?
3 Dinah That’s great, that’s wonderful you know. I mean, it’s got to be. Look at all the
4 problems. I mean all of what about eighty percent of the problems have been caused by
5 religion, people taking religion and using it you know. Not the religion, I mean you
6 know Jesus, I mean you know the Irish thing [laugh] it’s nothing to do with the
7 religion, it’s to do with us, what we’ve done to Ireland, not to do with religion. It’s
8 just been polarised like that you know. I mean (.) even sort of Muslims, I mean that
9 conference they had “Oh, you’re a Moslem.” When you read, that’s not what they’re
10 about you know, that’s not what they’re about. But you get somebody who says “I
11 have God on my shoulder and I can do anything now because he’s speaking in my
12 ear” (1) Um, so I think you know it’s very brave of him to do that. And I think er that
13 would be wonderful and hopefully if his son does it then it will happen. I mean the
14 sooner the church is disestablished I think it would be better in this country, all
15 countries.
Dinah’s positive evaluation of the Defender of Faiths role is based on an account
of religious bias, politics, and war. Attributing the cause of most problems to
religion, Dinah notes that it isn’t religion per se that leads to such issues but what
it is used for. Possibly alluding to the interviewer’s nationality (Northern Irish),
she gives the example of Ireland where tension has been understood on religious
grounds but actually is about one nation’s (“we’ve”) actions towards another. So
when religion and state are intertwined, conflict occurs and national groups mis-
understand one another. This misunderstanding is also given modern-day currency
noting the misrepresentation of Muslims beliefs. Dinah shifts from misperceptions
of religion to the religious few who are dogmatic in their views. Similar to Russ’s
characterization of his mum, Dinah uses active voicing to portray the undemo-
cratic and unreasonableness of religious people’s claims and entitlements (“I have
God on my shoulder and I can do anything now,” lines 10–11). Thus on the basis
that religion leads to conflict and underlines undemocratic views, Dinah concludes
that the Defender of Faiths role would offer a solution as would the disestablish-
ment of state and church globally.
So far we have considered how those who display some support for the change
in role for Prince Charles do so on the basis that it offers a resolution to undemo-
cratic and unreasonable acts and attitudes, offers unity in diversity, is consistent
with a changing population, upholds religious pluralism, and represents personal
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choice. In these accounts, to promote a particular religion is considered as anti-
thetical to democracy. Rather, it is equated with bias, intolerance, and has the
potential to lead to misunderstanding and conflict.
However, not all respondents thought that Charles’s wish to become Defender
of Faiths was a positive move. Rather, this could be understood as an undemocratic
imposition on people that reflected matters of personal stake and an abuse of power:
Extract 6: “He’s got darned all to do with it”
1 I What do you think of this idea
2 Dom Yes, of religions?
3 I Yes, yes, the defender of faiths
4 Peggy Well, yes, I, I don’t agree with that myself
5 Dom Well, he can say that if, if we disestablish, well he can’t say that, no, he actually can’t
6 say it can he? Because he isn’t (.) He is defender of the faith as defined. At the
7 moment. He can’t say faiths because he’s got nothing whatsoever to do with the
8 Catholic church and he hasn’t got anything to do with the Muslims or Sikhs. How
9 can he say he’s defending the Sikh faith? He’s got darned all to do with it for
10 heaven’s sake, you know (.) and what about Taoists and Buddhists who are here as
11 well?
Whilst Peggy offers her disagreement with Charles’s declaration, her husband
Dom repairs his initial estimation that a change in role is possible to a question
suggesting that it is probably not currently possible (“He is defender of the faith as
defined,” line 6). This constitutional fact is coupled with Charles’s lack of category
entitlements to represent different religions that are here, using extreme-case
formulations (“nothing whatsoever to do with,” line 7; “darned all to do with it,”
line 9). Hence, to claim to represent these various religious groups would be an
imposition upon their current freedoms.
Participants could also disagree on the basis that such a move would exclude
them:
Extract 7: “consistently excluded”
1 I Suppose over the past few years, erm, Prince Charles has been suggesting that he’d
2 like to be defender of
3 Ste All faiths. Yeah, well that’s another reason why I’m a republican (.) I mean I find it
4 disagreeable intensely because I don’t have any faith at all, and there’s, I almost find
5 there’s a collusion where people who, like me, who are atheists consistently
6 excluded from all sorts of debates, so peop-religious people you hear on the media
7 on the radio, debating amongst themselves about social phenomena
Noting both his political stance (republican) and lack of religion (atheist), Steve
expresses his negative attitudes to the Defender of Faiths role on the grounds that it
excludes people like himself. Moreover, there is a suggestion that this exclusion is
motivated by a religious conspiracy in which certain sections of society are
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normatively prevented from engaging in debates about the role of the monarch. So
the role of the monarch and their relationship to the people is characterized as a
religious concern rather than a national one and is therefore exclusionary.
The wish to change the role of the monarch could also be presented as
motivated by personal stake and interest rather than any real desire to represent the
population:
Extract 8: “It’s just sheer self-interest”
1 I I suppose over the past few years Prince Charles has kind of said that if he were ever
2 to become king he’d be defender of all faiths. What do you think of that?
3 Helen I think that Prince Charles is the most hateful person in this country [laugh]. I want
4 the monarchy banned because of him more than anybody else. He’s got a cheek to
5 talk about anybody’s faith. I’m an atheist as well so [laugh] so I don’t know if that
6 answers your question? Yeah, yeah. And he wants to be defender of all faiths
7 because to keep his own faith puts him in a difficult position with Camilla and the
8 Church of England and all that. You know it’s just sheer self-interest [laugh] (2) I
9 think English aristocracy in the 21st century, ridiculous, unbelievable (.) get rid of them
Using extrematization (Pomerantz, 1986), Helen evaluates Charles as “the most
hateful person in this country” (line 3) and the reasons behind her support in
eradicating the monarchy. Helen produces an interested account of Charles’s
self-serving stake in proposing a change to the role of defender of the faith.
Dismissing his entitlement to represent other people (“he’s got a cheek,” line 4),
she asserts that it is issues pertaining to his personal life and wish to marry a
Catholic divorcee (Camilla Parker-Bowles) that motivates his desire (“sheer self-
interest,” line 8) rather than a genuine wish to represent people. Moreover this
abuse of power is treated as symptomatic of the outdated class system in today’s
society. Her assertion that the aristocracy is an anachronism in modern society
renders them “ridiculous” and “unbelievable” and is the foundation for her final
proposition that we should “get rid of them” (line 9).
The final extract concerns a deviant case in which the respondent explicitly
presents himself as Christian in a “mixed emotions” account about Charles’s
declaration:
Extract 9: “I’d hate people to sort of label me as a bigot”
1 I I remember some time ago, there was talk of Prince Charles, and he said that, if he
2 were to become king, he would be defender of faiths, as opposed to defender of
3 the faith. I remember there being an awful lot of controversy around that.
4 Coop Mm, erm, yes, and where do, where do I stand on that one? Mm, erm (.) I don’t
5 know. I don’t know (2) I’m not I’m not erm (.) I can’t help but go and look back with
6 er, to, you know, to the time of, erm, (.) of Henry VIII and the erm, erm (.) and I think,
7 I get a very, I get a very mixed erm (.) emotions about it, because, being, having an
8 architectural background, when I go and look at the, at the awful way in which erm (.)
9 the, the priories and the abbeys were despoiled, you know, in the, in the name of,
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10 of, er religion, er, when, probably the principle thing was that they were merely
11 looking for diverting funds from that to something else . . . . . it was the
12 defence of the realm rather than the defence of the faith that was, was
13 happening . . . I suppose (1) I’m first and foremost (.) I suppose, I’m, I’m a Christian,
14 and therefore to, to that extent (.) erm (.) I would I would believe that he
15 should in fact be putting the Christian faith foremost. But, equally I’d hate people to
16 sort of label me as a bigot, and erm, you know, because I know it’s our faith to go
17 and say that. That, that, you know, thou shalt take no other gods, but that equally,
18 er, (.) I mean, the Muslim faith is in fact, you know, younger than the Christian one,
19 and, quite frankly, I mean. We are all, in, in terms of, you know, the erm (.) what is two
20 thousand years in, in relation to the age of the world, is, is which is five hundred
21 million years old, what is two thousand years to that? Charles himself, he’s, he’s of
22 course, is probably finds himself, because of his rather (.) poor chap, I mean he, he
23 was forced into a marriage that was, perhaps not the one of his choosing and
24 therefore he in fact chose to go and have a very permanent and longstanding
25 relationship of which we are now still seeing. But probably because of that, he in
26 fact, doesn’t wish to be seen to, to appear to be to partisan in any particular way,
27 and I wonder just how much he is really, he is saying that he would be, you know,
28 defender of the faith, and, regardless of people’s faith, be they Buddhist, Muslim, or
29 whatever.
In response to a “controversial” issue, (line 3) as defined by the interviewer,
Cooper produces a hedged account (“I don’t know. I don’t know,” lines 5–6) in
which he formulates his opinions. As conversation analysts point out, hedging
indicates trouble in interaction, and the reason for this becomes apparent in the
rest of the extract. Positioning himself as one with “mixed emotions” (line 7),
Cooper indicates his category entitlements (“having an architectural back-
ground,” lines 7–8) before contrasting the destruction of religious buildings with
“merely” fundraising. This becomes the foundation for an overarching claim that
historically, monarchs have been engaged in a form of ontological gerryman-
dering (Potter, 1996; Woolgar & Pawluch, 1985), framing the matter as one of
religion rather than national territory (“defence of the realm rather than defence
of the faith,” line 12).
More hedging occurs as Cooper confesses having a stake in the issue, “I’m a
Christian” (line 13). This sets him apart from other respondents who often denied
having any religious or personal investment in the matter. This gives Cooper
something of a dilemma; on the one hand acknowledging a religious identity
which upholds certain beliefs, whilst on the other being tolerant of other religions.
In doing so, he adopts a passive footing (“I suppose,” line 13) in declaring his faith
and in acknowledging the view of his faith on the topic (“I would, I would believe,”
line 14). The delicacy of this position, and the potential charge of being prejudiced
is oriented to in a disclaimer (“I’d hate people to sort of label me as a bigot,”
lines 15–16). Although he does not openly dismiss his religious beliefs, he puts
Christianity and the Muslim faith into a global context noting their youth in
comparison to the age of the earth, implying their insignificance.
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Cooper shifts to consider the future monarch’s motivations for a change in
role, and in an account littered with mitigated opinions (“probably,” lines 22 & 25;
“perhaps,” line 23; “I wonder,” line 27) and empathic evaluations of Charles’s
situation, makes available the observation that once again religion is being used as
a vehicle for mobilizing other concerns. In changing his role to Defender of Faiths,
Charles is actually upholding values of personal choice, based on personal nega-
tive experience of partisanship. That religion is used by monarchs past and future
as a means for achieving other more personal aims echoes arguments put forward
by Bob (extract 2) and Helen (extract 8) to argue for and against the proposed
constitutional change. Here. Cooper’s rejection of the Defender of Faiths title and
role is not based on his own Christian religious views, but on the lack of authen-
ticity underlying such a change.
Discussion
The paradox of the endurance of monarchies in modern societies remains
underexplored within social and political psychology. The aim of this paper has
been to offer some insight into how people in England understand the role of the
monarchy in representing its people. More specifically, it has focused on Prince
Charles’s 2002 proposed constitutional change from Defender of the (Christian)
Faith to Defender of Faiths. The rationale for this focus is based on the assump-
tions of, and implications for, the national, political, and religious community the
monarchy represents in England. This study therefore contributes to a scant social
psychological literature on the relationship between subjects and sovereign and
how the political values of the populace shape perceptions of the function and
legitimacy of a symbolic leader representing a national community.
Drawing on a body of social psychological work that maps out how values of
individual liberalism, pluralism and democracy form vernacular understandings of
nationhood and the national community in England, this study has examined how
these impinge on accounts of a symbolic leader’s proposed change in representing
“us.” Some existing work has considered how subjects reconcile democracy with
hereditary monarchy using egalitarian discourses that represent the royal family
as “doing a job” (Billig, 1992). However, the function and legitimacy of the
monarch’s role in symbolically representing a national community has more
far-reaching consequences in illuminating how people imagine their national
community.
The findings from this study suggest that the values of individual liberalism,
pluralism, and democracy are not juxtaposed to the monarchy, but pervade per-
ceptions of the monarch’s role. More specifically, those who displayed some
support for Prince Charles’s proposed constitutional change to the title Defender
of Faiths suggested that this could be a positive step towards reflecting a diverse
(religious) community, to bring the monarchy into line with current concerns of
pluralism, and to uphold the values of personal choice and individual rights. Such
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accounts offered a communitarian discourse, in which the role of the monarch was
to hold a diverse people together, and this change in title was for the greater good
of all.
Those respondents who rejected the proposed change in title did not do so
on the basis that the monarch should only represent a national community
held together by a common Christian religion. Rather, the same values of liberal
individualism, pluralism, and democracy also featured in these accounts such that
rejection of the future monarch’s wish was regarded as necessary to safeguard
these values. The move to become Defender of Faiths could be construed as
antithetical to these values in terms of reflecting personal stake and interest, an
abuse of power, or an imposition on other faiths. In short, it was not the business
of the monarch to impose his/her wishes on others as it contravened the principle
of individual rights.
How subjects understand the role of the monarch as a symbolic leader of their
national community is a complex affair, but our study suggests two key implica-
tions for the understanding of such symbolic national leaders. Firstly, in terms of
leadership, the monarchy is of course not popularly elected and therefore repre-
sents inherited privilege. In this sense monarchs are hardly prototypical of those
they represent. However if we consider that they occupy a traditional and symbolic
rather than a political role, we can see that their relationship to the populace is to
reflect and refract the values of the national community rather than their charac-
teristics. Indeed for those opposed to Charles’s position, the monarch would be
breaching their role to represent a sectional interest within the nation to the
exclusion of others. In other words, the role of monarch is precisely opposed to the
style of leadership hitherto considered in the Social Identity tradition (SIT), which
presupposes that leaders embody the interests and goals of their followers in order
to further ingroup interests against other groups. The role of the monarch for our
respondents is to symbolically represent and enact the values rather than pursue
the goals of the nation.
Secondly, our study points towards the role of the monarch as facilitating the
representation of the diversity of the national community. One implication of the
SIT emphasis on the prototypicality of the leader is the assumption of a perception
of ingroup homogeneity among group members. In contrast, for our respondents,
the monarch is taken to symbolically encompass the many different elements
within the nation without an assumption of interchangeability. Indeed the idea that
the monarch would represent a homogenous nation is actively resisted. While
many social psychologists have wrestled with the tension between the desire for a
common ingroup and the value of subgroups maintaining distinct identities (Gaert-
ner & Dovidio, 2000; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000), our research suggests one way in
which the diversity of the nation can be accommodated within a common repre-
sentation of the group. In line with previous investigations of the national imagi-
nation in terms of geography (Billig, 1995; Abell, Condor, & Stevenson, 2006),
symbolic architecture (Devine-Wright & Lyons, 1997), countryside (Wallwork &
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Dixon, 2004) and national history (Condor, 2006; Condor & Abell, 2006a), our
research attests to the manner in which the nation can be strategically constructed
around a symbol, the monarch, in order to display the values rather than the
characteristics of the population. Further research could profitably consider other
such ways in which the ideals of diversity and pluralism can be made manifest in
representations of the national community.
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